In every hospital I have worked in, there comes a moment in the engagement when a senior leader lowers their voice and tells me, as a sensitive aside, that one of the departments is difficult. The pharmacy blames the ward nursing team. The ward nursing team blames pharmacy. The registrars blame the rota. The HR function blames the registrars’ handover of information about leave. The information is delivered with some discomfort, because the leader considers it a political matter, a sign of interpersonal friction that good leadership should be managing toward resolution. My usual response surprises them. I ask for more detail about the blaming, not less. I ask who blames whom, for what, and in what direction. The blaming is not a problem to be managed. It is one of the most information-rich operational signals the hospital produces.
This reframing matters because the conventional reading of inter-functional blame — that it is a conflict-management problem — leads to exactly the wrong kind of intervention. The leadership team responds by convening a facilitated meeting between the departments, running through a structured conversation about collaboration, and achieving a truce that may or may not last until the next quarter. Nothing structural changes. The same blame pattern reappears three months later, in slightly different language, between the same functions. The intervention has addressed the symptom, not the signal. The signal was operational all along.
The ORBIT layer of CuraOS treats inter-functional blame as a primary diagnostic signal rather than as HR friction. The argument of this post is that blame in hospitals follows distinct patterns, that each pattern points to a specific class of structural problem, and that each structural problem has a specific remediation that is operational rather than interpersonal. The leadership team that reads the blame structurally does substantially better work than the leadership team that tries to facilitate it away.
The observation: when a function blames another function in a hospital, the blaming is usually a reliable report of a structural handoff that has become unowned. The correct response is curiosity about the pattern the blaming is tracing, not conflict management applied to the personalities involved.
Why blame is structural rather than interpersonal.
Functions in hospitals do not blame each other for no reason. The people inside the functions are, in my experience, overwhelmingly reasonable, professional, and genuinely motivated to do good work. When they blame, they are reporting the specific place where the work they are responsible for depends on the work of another function and where that dependency has produced reliable problems. The blaming is not personality clash; it is a professional report that the handoff between them is not functioning. What leadership teams hear as interpersonal friction is almost always a diagnostic signal about the operational architecture.
The reason the signal gets misread is that blame is delivered in the vocabulary of people — “pharmacy is impossible,” “nursing never tells us in time” — rather than in the vocabulary of structure. The grammatical form of the complaint hides its structural content. A leadership team that listens past the grammar to the underlying pattern discovers that the same people who blame each other in a dysfunctional structure collaborate well when the structure is fixed, and that personality-level interventions in a structurally broken system produce short-term truces and long-term recurrence.
This framing is not a minimisation of interpersonal dynamics. Interpersonal friction is real, and occasionally the primary driver of a problem. But in hospital settings specifically, in my observational experience, inter-functional blame is structural in origin at least four times out of five. The structural reading is the right starting hypothesis, with the interpersonal reading held in reserve for cases where the structural remediation fails to resolve the pattern.
The three patterns.
Inter-functional blame in hospitals clusters into three distinct structural patterns. Each pattern has a characteristic shape, a characteristic cause, and a characteristic remediation. Distinguishing which pattern is operating in a specific case is the first diagnostic move.
Different blaming signals different fixes.
The first pattern — unowned handoff — is the most common. Blame flows in a sequence: function A blames function B, function B blames function C, function C blames function A. Each function is reasonably performing its internal work; the failures occur at the handoffs between them, and no single function has operational ownership of the handoff itself. The pharmacy completes its dispensing correctly but the medication arrives on the ward at the wrong time for the discharge process; the ward notes the timing problem and blames pharmacy; pharmacy notes that nobody told them the discharge time and blames the ward; both are technically correct and the handoff itself is what is missing.
The remediation is to name an owner for the handoff. Not a boundary between the two functions, but a specific role or named individual whose job is the handoff’s functioning end-to-end. The owner has authority to work across both functions and responsibility for the handoff’s operational quality. Once the handoff is owned, the blame disappears — not because the underlying issues have resolved, but because the information the blame was carrying now has a legitimate operational channel in the owner’s accountability structure.
The second pattern — asymmetric load — appears when one function is blamed by multiple others but blames nobody in particular itself. The pattern often settles on middle-management functions such as bed management, outpatient scheduling, or central coding, where the function’s work is structurally overloaded relative to its resources and it is unable to respond to all the legitimate demands placed on it. The other functions, experiencing the slow response, blame the overloaded function for unresponsiveness. The overloaded function, operating at capacity, cannot defend itself in the blame dynamic because acknowledging the overload would require the leadership team to rebalance the structural load.
The remediation is to examine whether the function is genuinely overloaded at a structural level. This is a capacity question, not a performance question; the function is almost always performing as well as its structural position allows. The remediation is load rebalancing: either increasing the function’s resources, reducing its scope, or redistributing demand across adjacent functions. What does not work is training, culture-building, or performance management applied to the overloaded function, which addresses the wrong cause.
The third pattern — missing role — is the most systemic and the hardest to see. The blame does not point to any specific function; it points to “the system,” “the hospital,” “how things are done here.” Multiple functions independently recognise that something needs to happen but no one owns it, because the role that would own it has never been created. Discharge coordination across the weekend, for example, in a hospital that has not installed a weekend operational function — everyone knows the gap exists, everyone blames the vague “system” for it, but the role that would fix it does not yet exist in the organisational structure.
The remediation is to create the missing role. This is a structural addition rather than a load rebalancing; the work needs to exist as a named responsibility before anyone can do it. The role often looks small on paper — a half-time weekend coordination function, a named pathway lead, a concurrent coding role — but its absence causes disproportionate operational friction until it is established.
”When everyone in the room complains about ‘the system,’ the leadership team is not hearing cynicism. They are hearing the department’s accurate report that a role needs to exist that does not yet exist. The blame is the clearest signal the team will produce about what needs to be built.”
How to read the pattern in practice.
The diagnostic move is to map the blame across a full month before intervening. Not one complaint at a time, but the accumulated pattern across the operational meetings, the informal conversations with functional leaders, the comments in quality reviews. Write down who blamed whom for what, in which direction, with what frequency. Let the pattern surface in the data rather than in the most salient individual complaint.
The pattern almost always reveals itself cleanly. If blame is flowing in a sequence around a process, it is probably an unowned handoff. If one function is consistently named by multiple others while itself naming nobody, it is probably asymmetric load. If the blame is diffuse and attaches to abstractions rather than specific functions, it is probably a missing role. Mixed cases exist, but most engagements produce one dominant pattern that accounts for the majority of the friction.
Once the pattern is identified, the remediation follows directly. The leadership team that does this consistently discovers that the blame that looked like a human-resources problem was in fact a map of the structural work that most needed doing. The map is free; the accumulated blame produced it at no cost. Reading the map correctly is the whole operational move.
What leadership teams tend to get wrong.
Three characteristic errors keep hospitals from using blame as data.
Treating blame as a professionalism problem. The leadership team concludes that the department has a “culture of blame” and that the remediation is cultural. Training is commissioned. Facilitated conversations are held. Values statements are reviewed. The structural cause remains unchanged. The blame re-emerges. The cycle repeats. Culture cannot compensate for structural failure indefinitely; the blame is the symptom of the structure’s continued inadequacy, and addressing only the symptom produces only temporary reduction.
Taking the most vocal complaint at face value. The loudest function in the blame dynamic is often not the most accurate diagnostician. Vocal functions complain because they are socially positioned to do so; quiet functions may be suffering equivalent or greater structural problems but lack the voice to raise them. The diagnostic value of blame comes from mapping the full pattern, not from responding to the loudest voice. Leadership teams that respond reactively to the most vocal complaint often deprioritise structurally more significant but less vocal issues.
Fixing the boundary rather than the handoff. When unowned-handoff blame is heard, the temptation is to sharpen the functional boundaries — “pharmacy is responsible for X, ward is responsible for Y.” This often makes the handoff worse because the boundary sharpening formalises the gap between functions without creating ownership of the gap itself. The right move is to name a handoff owner whose work explicitly crosses the boundary, not to police the boundary more strictly.
What the Schlüchtern ORBIT work showed on blame-as-data.
At Main-Kinzig-Kliniken Schlüchtern, the geriatric department used inter-functional blame as a diagnostic input during the operational programme with Prof. Dr. Rainer Sibbel at Frankfurt School [1,2]. Three of the significant structural changes installed across 2020–2022 were triggered by systematic reading of accumulated blame. The concurrent-coding role (Posts 15 and 21) emerged from missing-role blame — clinicians, coders, and ward staff all complained about “how coding works here” without anyone being able to specify who owned the gap. The weekend operational coordinator role emerged from the same pattern, applied to discharge coordination. The pathway-lead-on-round discipline (Post 8) emerged from unowned-handoff blame between the ORBIT cohort leads and the ward round team.
None of these structural changes were conceived in the abstract as good ideas to install. All three were installed in response to specific patterns the blame mapping revealed. The blame was operational intelligence that preceded the structural intervention and pointed to exactly the intervention that was needed. Reading it as interpersonal friction would have produced cultural responses that did not address what was actually broken; reading it structurally produced specific, bounded, measurable operational changes.
The cross-hospital pattern is consistent. Hospitals that cultivate the habit of mapping inter-functional blame before intervening produce more targeted operational changes than hospitals that treat blame as HR friction. The discipline costs nothing other than listening more carefully. The diagnostic signal it unlocks is substantial.
The operational readingBlame between functions is not pathology, failure of professionalism, or culture problem. It is the hospital’s operational staff reporting, in the vocabulary available to them, where the structural architecture has produced gaps that their individual professionalism cannot close. A leadership team that listens to blame as data rather than managing it as conflict has access to one of the most reliable diagnostic signals in hospital operations. The signal is free. The response is operational.
What to do on Monday.
For the next month, keep a private working document of the inter-functional complaints that cross your desk. Who complained about whom, for what, in what direction. Do not intervene yet; just record.
At the end of the month, map the pattern. Is the blame sequential (A blames B, B blames C, C blames A)? That is unowned handoff. Is one function named by multiple others without itself naming anyone? That is asymmetric load. Is the blame attached to “the system” or similar abstractions? That is missing role. Most months will show one dominant pattern.
Apply the corresponding remediation. For unowned handoff, convene the functions involved and name a handoff owner — a specific person, not a committee, with authority crossing both functional boundaries and responsibility for the handoff’s operational quality. For asymmetric load, commission an analysis of the named function’s structural capacity and demand, and decide whether the answer is load rebalancing, resource addition, or scope reduction. For missing role, draft the role specification for the function that does not yet exist, and identify either an internal candidate to take it on or the resource allocation needed to create it.
Do not convene a facilitated conversation between the blaming parties as the first move. Facilitation in advance of structural remediation almost always produces temporary truce without durable change. Structural remediation in advance of facilitation produces durable change, and the facilitation often becomes unnecessary because the blame dissolves when the structure is fixed.
Run the monthly mapping as an ongoing discipline, not a one-off diagnostic. The pattern of blame across a year is a reliable leading indicator of where structural work will be needed next. Leadership teams that treat the mapping as routine develop an intuitive sense for which interventions are operational and which are genuinely interpersonal. The intuition is one of the most valuable leadership capacities the discipline produces.
Fingerpointing is data. The department that blames is reporting. The leadership team that listens carefully receives a map of the structural work most needing to be done. The map comes free with the job; reading it correctly is the work. Read it.
Sources cited in this post.
- Main-Kinzig-Kliniken Schlüchtern. Operational data of the geriatric department, 2019–2025. Internal records, available on request.
- Matoski N, Sibbel R. The FLOW methodology: operational transformation of a geriatric department — quantitative evidence from a 7-year programme. Manuscripts in preparation. Frankfurt School of Finance & Management; 2026.
A note on methodologyThe three-pattern taxonomy (unowned handoff, asymmetric load, missing role) is a practice framework developed across operational engagements and reflects observational patterns rather than a formal classification. The “four times out of five” estimate for structural-versus-interpersonal origin of inter-functional blame is an observational figure from engagements rather than an empirically established proportion. The Schlüchtern examples (concurrent-coding role, weekend coordinator, pathway lead on round) are from the geriatric department’s internal records under the formal research programme with Prof. Dr. Rainer Sibbel at Frankfurt School; the causal reading that blame mapping preceded structural intervention reflects the author’s judgment of the programme’s sequence.